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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As did Wife's original brief, the Reply Brief of Appellant now further magnifies the 
same or similar shortcomings, while nevertheless showing signs of having been edited with 
considerably greater care, one is forced to conclude that its continuing pattern of intentional 
disregard for those boundaries of acceptable argument is deliberate. While adding nothing 
to the substantial facts of the case, the brief ignores dispositive and settled principles of law. 
mischaracterizes the holdings of several of the cases which it cites in support of its spurious 
arguments, further misrepresents the facts of record, and introduces for the first time in these 
proceedings a poisonous and improper argument based on alleged "fault" of Husband, 
notwithstanding that the issue of the parties' comparative fault was not before the trial court 
and was expressly excluded from the court's considerations with the consent of both parties. 
See, Appendix A. 
Wife's reply brief thus fails to meet the requirement of Utah R. App. P. 24(j) that it 
be "presented with accuracy . . . and free from . . . irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous 
matters." Nevertheless, the present Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee will confine 
itself to a response on the merits, leaving the imposition of sanctions if any for another day 
and to the discretion of the Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wife chooses to ignore the overwhelming weight of authority requiring equal 
distribution of marital property except where there is a clear and specific showing of 
exceptional circumstances. She has shown no such exceptional circumstances, and the trial 
court's grossly disproportionate award to her of two-thirds of the marital estate was therefore 
error. The trial court's award to Wife of $4,000 of monthly alimony is entirely without 
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support in the record, and her casual invocation of alleged wrongdoing by Husband to shore 
up an otherwise impoverished argument not only violates an understanding reached between 
the parties and the trial court, but improperly raises for the first time in reply an issue that 
was untouched in Husband's brief. 
POINT I. 
WIFE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION 
THAT MARITAL PROPERTY IS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY 
The use of the make-weight phrase "mathematical precision" in Wife's reply brief on 
this point will be seen by this Court for what it is, a rhetorical device to divert attention from 
the poverty of Wife's argument. (Wife's counsel well know that Husband has never used 
that phrase nor requested any such result.) Wife's brief studiously avoids any reference to 
or attempt to distinguish the many Utah cases which articulate the presumption that marital 
property will be divided equally. See e.g., Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1172 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Hall v. Hall, 858 
P.2d 1018,1022 (Utah Ct. App. \993)\ Finlayson v. Finlayson, %14?2d %43,M9 (\]XdhCi. 
App. 1994). Nor does the brief address the trial court's failure to make the necessary findings 
of exceptional circumstances required to overcome that presumption. See Burt, 799 P.2d at 
1172, n. 10 ("exceptional circumstances");/fa//, 858 P.2d at 1022 ("unusual circumstances"): 
Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ^ 23-24, 987 P.2d (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) 
("[exceptional circumstances"). 
Suggesting that a remand for the purpose of making the required findings would be 
a waste of time, Wife seeks to divert the focus of the argument from the fact that there were 
no such exceptional circumstances, as appropriate findings would have disclosed. Wife has 
identified no evidence in the record which might constitute such exceptional circumstances 
2 
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or provide the basis for the necessary7 findings. She can do no better than invoke (as did the 
trial court) the irrelevant and improperly considered fact that husband had significant 
separate property, to which the brief adds, falsely, that "Wife, on the other hand, had no 
earning capacity and no separate assets." Wife, in fact, had receptionist and secretarial 
(including computer word-processing) skills, had recently received an inheritance from her 
father, and was at the time of trial one of two owners of a townhouse condominium in Mesa, 
Arizona not included in the marital estate. R: 99; R: 325:33-35 and 98-99. The 
representation to the contrary is deliberately false. 
The brief contends that "[t]he appropriateness of the unequal division becomes . . . 
apparent when the actual physical distribution of assets is taken into account. . . ." Reply 
Brief of Appellant, p. 14. But the confusing discussion which follows makes no such point. 
Indeed, since the trial court distributed more or less equally all the marital assets with the 
exception of the residence and the related mortgage obligation (the house going to Wife, the 
mortgage to Husband, a result which Wife seeks to preserve), it is hard to see how the sale 
of the house and equal distribution of the liquid balance remaining after paying off the 
mortgage could have reduced Wife's liquidity or ability "to provide for her future". 
As for the "significant [but unspecified] built-in tax consequences" which she claims, 
there is not a shred of evidence in the record on that subject, no indication that such issues 
were considered by the trial court, nor that the tax result to her would have been any different 
had the house and the mortgage obligation been equally divided. She has in fact since sold 
the house, with whatever tax consequences that entailed. 
In short, Wife cannot overcome the presumption of equal distribution of marital 
property since she cannot show the required "exceptional circumstances". Accordingly, the 
appropriate response of this Court is not to remand to the trial court for findings, which it 
3 
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clearly cannot make, of exceptional circumstances sufficient to sustain its grossly 
disproportionate division of the marital estate, but rather to direct that the marital property 
be divided equally in conformity with the well-established rule that, in the absence of such 
exceptional circumstances, marital property is to be so divided. That requires a simple 
reformation of the decree to provide that the residence and associated mortgage be divided 
with rough symmetry, as were the other marital assets and liabilities. "Mathematical 
precision" is not required. 
POINT II. 
WIFE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE AN EQUITABLY 
COGNIZABLE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD 
OF $4,000 MONTHLY ALIMONY. 
Wife does not dispute, and the law is clear, that alimony is remedial in nature, 
awarded in response to "need." See cases cited in Brief of Appellee/Cross- Appellant, 30-31. 
Wife's argument in reply fails to address the material facts of record which bear on the 
application of that case law to the present matter. They are: (1) She was awarded property 
with an income-producing capacity of $7,092.57 per month. Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, ^ J 36, R. 326-327 (While she may now disagree with the trial court's 
methodology in determining that figure, Wife made no objection to the finding below, 
offered no alternative, and is foreclosed from raising the issue at this late date.); (2) She 
possesses, additionally, earning capacity which is at least that of a reasonably skilled 
receptionist/typist with computer word-processing skills. R. 324:195-197; and (3) She herself 
represented her needs to the Trial Court as $7,652 per month which included $2,232.00 for 
a mortgage which Husband has been ordered to pay by the Court. R. 214-216. Plaintiffs 
Post-Trial Brief, 17, R. 124. 
4 
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We do not trouble this Court with further argument based on these facts, the 
implications of which are obvious and the case law relating to which was thoroughly 
reviewed in Husband's initial brief. Wife has no need of alimony, and in the absence of 
need, it was error for the Trial Court to award it. 
What is deeply troubling in this connection is the attempt of Wife to insert into the 
issues on appeal poisonous and improper references to, and commentary on, the alleged fault 
of Husband in relation to his association during the marriage with his present wife and the 
suggestion that this Court should consider that fact in connection with its review of the issue 
of alimony. As a part of a proffer by Wife's counsel at the close of trial, the parties 
understood and were assured by the trial court that the comparative fault of the parties was 
not an issue in this case and would not be considered. Based on the court's assurance, to 
which Wife's counsel made no objection, Husband's counsel waived his rights of cross-
examination of any witnesses on the subject and his right to call witnesses as to Wife's fault. 
R. 326: 102-106. In reliance on that understanding, Husband refrained from placing any 
evidence on the record as to Wife's comparative responsibility for the disintegration of the 
marriage. 
The issue of "fault" was thus not before the trial court and cannot therefore now be 
raised on appeal. In strict conformity with that limitation, Husband's initial brief on appeal 
contains not a single word of reference to Wife's contribution to marital discord. Wife's 
attempt to insert that issue is thus a blatant and uncalled for attempt improperly to influence 
this Court by reference to emotionally charged matter that is not before the Court. The matter 
so referred to by Wife is, within the language of Utah R. App. P. 24(j) "scandalous", not for 
the nature of Husband's conduct, as to which his story has not been told, but for its 
introduction in this proceeding by Wife. It must therefore be disregarded by the Court. 
5 
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CONCLUSION 
Husband renews his request that Wife's appeal be denied and his Cross-Appeal be 
granted, with the result (1) that the division of the marital estate be reformed to divide 
equally to the parties the award of their former residence and the related mortgage and (2) 
that the award of alimony to Wife be reversed. 
Dated thisc^Vday of April, 2000. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
.ARK W. SESSIONS 
T. MICKELL JIMENEZ 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
/Cross-Appellant James T. Jensen 
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1 THE COURT: MR. CHRISTENSEN? 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: YES. 
3 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THEN WITH 
4 THAT IN MIND, THEN, I WOULD ACCEPT A SIMULTANEOUS 
5 FILING, LET'S SAY, BY MONDAY, THE 10TH. 
6 MR. SESSIONS: THAT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL, 
7 TO GIVE US THAT MUCH TIME. THANK YOU. 
8 THE COURT: GIVES YOU BOTH ADEQUATE TIME? 
9 MR. SESSIONS: YES. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: YES. 
11 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. PLEASE 
12 BE SEATED. AND MR. CHRISTENSEN, YOU MAY MAKE YOUR 
13 PROFFER. 
14 MR. CHRISTENSEN: YOUR HONOR, I SIMPLY 
15 WANTED TO MAKE A BRIEF PROFFER AS IT MAY RELATE TO 
16 THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY. AND THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE 
17 THAT FOLLOWING THE WILBERG MINE AND THE PERIOD OF 
18 TIME THAT THE WITNESS TESTIFIED CONCERNING THE 
19 DEFENDANT'S BEING IN SALT LAKE CITY FOR EXTENDED 
20 PERIODS OF TIME AND AWAY FROM THE FAMILY RESIDENCE, 
21 WHICH AT THAT TIME WAS IN PRICE, THAT THE DEFENDANT 
22 BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH A SECRETARY PARALEGAL 
2 3 EMPLOYED BY UTAH POWER AND LIGHT, THAT THAT 
24 RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED, AND THAT WHEN THE DEFENDANT 
2 5 AND PLAINTIFF MOVED TO SALT LAKE CITY IN 1990, THAT 
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1 THE DEFENDANT HIRED THAT PERSON AS HIS PARALEGAL, 
2 AND THAT THIS CAUSED ARGUMENTS, PERHAPS BEST 
3 DESCRIBED AS FIGHTS. 
4 THAT THE PLAINTIFF REPEATEDLY ASKED THE 
5 DEFENDANT TO DISCONTINUE THIS RELATIONSHIP, THAT HE 
6 REFUSED TO DO SO, AND THAT THAT RELATIONSHIP HAS 
7 CONTINUED TO THE PRESENT TIME AND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
8 IS PRESENTLY LIVING WITH THAT PERSON IN SALT LAKE 
9 CITY. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING, 
11 MR. SESSIONS, IN TERMS OF ANY PROFFER OTHERWISE? 
12 MR. SESSIONS: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD JUST 
13 REEMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT MR. JENSEN HAS PREVIOUSLY 
14 TESTIFIED HE'S NEVER BEEN SUPPORTED BY HIS WIFE IN 
15 THE RANCHING AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS. 
16 THAT, AS HE JUST TESTIFIED A MOMENTS AGO, 
17 THAT MARRIAGE, FOR A WHOLE LOT OF REASONS, HAS BEEN 
18 ON THE ROCKS FOR AN AWFULLY LONG TIME, TO USE 
19 COUNSEL'S WORDS. 
20 AND WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE IT'S TRUE THAT HE 
21 DID HIRE THIS INDIVIDUAL, AND IT IS TRUE THAT THIS 
22 INDIVIDUAL IS LIVING WITH HIM, LIVING WITH HIM 
23 CURRENTLY, THAT THE MARRIAGE WAS IN A POSITION WHERE 
24 IT COULD NOT BE RESOLVED LONG BEFORE THEN. 
2 5 THE COURT: OKAY. I VIEW THAT AS ARGUMENT. 
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1 I WAS ASKING REALLY FOR A PROFFER OF THE FACTS. 
2 MR. SESSIONS: I'M SORRY. NOTHING IN 
3 ADDITION TO WHAT THE DEFENDANT HAS TESTIFIED TO. 
4 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NO PROFFER IN 
5 DISPUTE. I MEAN, THERE ARE REASONS EXPLAINING IT, 
6 AS YOU'VE ARGUED. BUT THERE IS NO CONTEST OF THE 
7 SUBSTANCE--
8 I MR. SESSIONS: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
9 THE COURT: WELL, THIS IS WHY I'M -- I HAVE 
10 A BIT OF A PROBLEM WITH THE PROFFER. LET ME JUST 
11 SAY THAT TO ALL OF YOU, I HAVE GOT ALL THE PARTIES 
12 HERE, EVERYBODY HERE. I THINK WE ALL KNOW THAT FOR 
13 A LONG TIME THAT COURTS AREN'T IN A POSITION OF 
14 DENYING DIVORCES. 
15 PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO DIVORCES, AND IF 
16 THERE'S A LOSS OF LOVE AND AFFECTION BETWEEN THE 
17 PARTIES, BY ONE OR THE OTHER, THEN I'M NOT GOING TO 
18 BE IN A POSITION WHERE I'M GOING TO SAY, "WELL, I'M 
19 AWFULLY SORRY, I'M GOING TO DENY THE DIVORCE." 
20 GROUNDS AND PROPERTY DIVISION ARE 
21 RELATIVELY, IN MY JUDGMENT, MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. AND 
22 I KNOW THERE IS A RECENT STATUTE THAT DEALS WITH 
23 FAULT, AND THAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE PROFFER. I 
24 THINK I'VE MENTIONED TO COUNSEL THAT FROM MY, 
25 PERSPECTIVE WHILE I'M OBLIGATED TO FOLLOW THE LAW, 
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AND I WILL LOOK AT THAT LAW AGAIN, AND SEE IF I 
THINK IT APPLIES IN THIS CASE, THIS CASE IS 
PRINCIPALLY A DIVISION OF PROPERTY CASE. 
AND I DOUBT THAT ANY PROFFER OTHERWISE IN 
WITH REGARD TO FAULT IS GOING TO IMPACT THE 
DIVISION. 
MR. SESSIONS: AND, YOUR HONOR, I 
UNDERSTAND THAT. BUT IN THE INTEREST OF PROTECTING 
MY CLIENT, THE PROBLEM I HAVE WITH THE PROFFER IS, 
THAT I DON'T HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
THE WITNESS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROFFER. 
I DON'T HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY -- I GUESS THE 
COURT WOULD GIVE IT TO US, TO PERMIT ME TO PUT MR. 
JENSEN BACK ON AND EXPLAIN WHY THE SITUATION 
HAPPENED AS IT HAPPENED. AND HE HAS A NUMBER OF 
REASONS. BUT I THINK THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DO 
THAT WITH TESTIMONY, UNDER OATH, SUBJECT TO 
CROSS-EXAMINATION, AS OPPOSED TO A PROFFER OF 
EVIDENCE. 
I WOULD THEREFORE MAKE THIS REQUEST: THAT 
IF YOUR HONOR, AFTER REVIEWING THE LAW, DETERMINES 
TO DO ANYTHING WITH ANY ISSUE IN THIS CASE BASED 
UPON FAULT, THAT WE BE GIVEN THE RIGHT, THEN, TO PUT 
ON EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO THAT. 
THE COURT: THAT'S AN INTERESTING 
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2JL6. 
1 PRESERVATION. I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOU THAT I HAVE 
2 ALREADY MADE MY STATEMENT AS TO HOW I FEEL ABOUT THE 
3 EXCLUSIVITY OF FAULT AND DIVISION OF PROPERTY. I 
4 VIEW THEM AS MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. NOW, I DON'T 
5 SUGGEST THAT I HAVE THE DIVINE CAPACITY TO SAY 
6 WHETHER ANY OF THE THESE THINGS HAVE AFFECTED ME IN 
7 TERMS OF THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY. 
8 I WILL JUST TELL YOU THAT I DON'T THINK 
9 THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE ANY BEARING. BUT WHAT I 
10 WOULD WANT FROM YOU IN TERMS OF A COUNTER PROFFER IS 
11 NOT ARGUMENT, BUT DENIAL THAT IT OCCURRED. AND IF 
12 THERE IS A DENIAL, THEN I HAVE A DISPUTE IN 
13 EVIDENCE. BUT IF THERE IS NO DENIAL, THEN IT JUST 
14 SIMPLY STANDS AS PART OF THE RECORD. 
15 MR. SESSIONS: I UNDERSTAND THAT, YOUR 
16 HONOR. I DIDN'T KNOW THAT PROFFER WAS COMING UNTIL 
17 A FES MINUTES AGO. MAY I HAVE JUST THIRTY SECONDS 
18 WITH MR. JENSEN? 
19 THE COURT: CERTAINLY, YES. 
2 0 (MR. SESSIONS CONFERS WITH CLIENT OFF THE 
21 RECORD.) 
22 MR. SESSIONS: YOUR HONOR, WE'LL NOT OFFER 
23 ANYTHING BY WAY OF PROFFER IN REBUTTAL TO THE 
24 EVIDENCE THAT HAS BEEN PROFFERED. 
2 5 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. I 
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